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COMMENTS
ADMIRALTY: "UPON NAVIGABLE WATERS" REQUIREMENT FOR
JURISDICTION UNDER THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKER'S ACT OF 1927
Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968)
Four longshoremen, while working on land, were injured in three
separate accidents.' Distinguishing the cases on the basis of the situs of
the injuries, two District Courts affirmed the rulings of the deputy
commissioner, allowing death benefits under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's Act of 19272 to the longshoreman thrown into the
water and drowned and denying benefits to the three remaining claim-
ants who had sustained injury solely on land.3 The cases were consol-
idated on appeal to the Fourth Circuit, which reversed the District
Court denials of recovery under the federal act.4 Held: the jurisdiction
of the Longshoremen's Act is grounded on the function or status of the
injured employee-not on the situs of the injury.
I. EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND BACKGROUND
The early 1900's marked the passage by several states of workmen's
compensation laws. The intent was to provide speedy and adequate
relief to the injured workman and, in the case of death, to the depen-
dents. The ideal manner of accomplishing this goal was to remove the
costly hazards of litigation and proof of negligence. Before 1917, both
1. Avery v. Oosting, 245 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1965); Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp.
184 (D. Md. 1965); Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 238 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. Va. 1965).
2. Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death
of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occuring
upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock) and if
recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings
may not validly be provided by State law.
33 U.s.C. I 903(a) (1964).
3. One of the three plaintiff-appellants denied recovery under the federal act was a
widow seeking death benefits. All of the employee-stevedores were injured by a free-
swinging draft of a loading crane.
4. Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968).
5. See A. LAsoN, WoRM.EN'S COMPENSATxON LAw §§ 89.10-.60 (1952).
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federal 6 and stater courts held that state compensation statutes pro-
vided coverage for all land-based workers (as contrasted with seamen)
and that the locale of the injury was immaterial. Thus, longshoremen
and other harbor workers were within the jurisdiction of state com-
pensation acts.
In 1917 however, the Supreme Court, placing the Constitution and
maritime uniformity above sympathy,8 ruled in Southern Pacific Com-
pany v. Jensen that longshoremen injured on vessels or on gangplanks
between vessels and piers were exclusively within federal maritime
jurisdiction and thus barred from any recovery under a state compen-
sation act.9 The net result of this decision was to leave harbor workers
injured upon navigable waters without workmen's compensation of
any kind.10 Following that decision, Congress enacted two federal acts,
ostensibly applying state compensation relief to workers injured on
navigable waters. Both acts were struck down by the Court as unconsti-
tutional delegations of authority to the states.1 The Longshoremen's
Act of 1927, enacted pursuant to the Supreme Court's suggestion in
State of Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Company,12 filled the shoreline
vacuum in employment compensation coverage created by Jensen.13
The issue raised in Marine Stevedoring Corporation v. Oosting14 con-
cerns the jurisdiction of that Act over injuries occurring on land sus-
tained by workers while acting within the scope of their employment
as maritime workers.
6. Riegel v. Higgins, 241 F. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1917); Berton v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Dock
Co., 219 F. 763 (D.N.J. 1915).
7. Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 A. 372 (1915); Lindstrom v.
Mutual S.S. Co., 132 Minn. 328, 156 N.W. 669 (1916). But c.f. Schuede v. Zenith S.S,
Co., 216 F. 566, 571 (N.D. Ohio 1914).
8. It was estimated that some 300,000 longshoremen and harbor workers, whose employ-
ment is by its inherent nature hazardous, were deprived of a compensation remedy. See
Comment, The Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, 48 YA=E L.J. 640 (1934).
9. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
10. See Huttenbrauck, Maritime Personal Injury Cases-The Twilight Zone, 1965 INS.
COuNsL J. 92, 93.
11. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
12. 264 US. 219 (1924).
13. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); see Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v.
Arrien, 344 F.2d 640, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1965); Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md.
1965). See generally, G. GILsmoE & C. BLAcK, ADMIRALTY § 6-45 (1957).
14. 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968).
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II. "UPON NAVIGABLE WATERS"
Before the passage of the Admiralty Extension Act of 1948,15 there
appears to be no support for the proposition that the Longshoremen' s
Act encompassed an injury incurred completely on land. While the
exercise of Commerce Clause jurisdiction over all maritime workers
was forcefully urged before Congress in 1927,16 the Congressional his-
tory clearly indicates that the intent of the legislation was to fill the
void created by Jensen in workmen's compensation for harbor work-
ers.' 7 The Act prescribes that its jurisdiction shall extend compensation
to disability or death "only if the disability or death results from an
injury occurring upon navigable waters of the United States (including
any dry dock).. ."Is The Supreme Court in State Industrial Commis-
sion v. Nordenholt Corporation19 made it clear that the federal com-
pensation laws did not extend to injuries on land.20 The occupation
status of the longshoreman, therefore, had no bearing on his ability
to make a federal claim. 21 Obviously, the line between sea and land
is a fine one. Protrusions from the land often stretch far out over the
water. The courts have, therefore, been forced to characterize different
structures as either land or "upon navigable water." Docks, wharves,
piers (as in the instant case), and similar structures were considered,
15. Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act of 1948, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
16. See Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184, 189 (D. Md. 1965).
17. The purpose of this bill is to provide for compensation, in the stead of liability,
for a class of employees commonly known as "longshoremen." These men are mainly
employed in loading, unloading, refitting, and repairing ships; but it should be
remarked that injuries occurring in loading or unloading are not covered unless they
occur on the ship or between the wharf and the ship so as to bring them within the
maritime jurisdiction of the United States.
S. RP. No. 973, 69th CONG., Ist SSS. 16 (1926); Clark, The Longshoreman and Accident
Compensation, 22 MONTHLY LABoR REV. 753, 756 (1926).
18. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)
(1964).
19. 259 U.S. 263 (1922).
20. See, e.g., Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946); Travelers Ins. Co. v Shea, 382
F2d 344 (5th Cir. 1967); Nicholson v. Calbeck, 385 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1967); Houser v.
O'Leary, 383 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1967); Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 640 (2d
Cir. 1965); Taylor v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 344 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1965); Hastings v.
Mann, 340 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1965); American Export Lines, Inc. v. Revel, 266 F.2d 82
(4th Cir. 1959); Travelers Ins. Co. v. McManigal, 139 F.2d 949 (4th Cir. 1944); Johnson v.
Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965); cf. Interlake Steamship Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d
879 (6th Cir. 1964).
21. "[T]he coverage of the Act is not keyed to function but has uniformly been situs-
oriented." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Shea, 382 F.2d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1967). But see Holland v.
Harrison Bros. Dry Dock & Repair Yard, Inc., 306 F.2d 369, 372 (5th Cir. 1962).
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consistent with the admiralty decisions prior to the passage of the Long-
shoremen's Act, as extensions of the land. Injuries occurring on a pier
were, as a result, not "upon navigable waters" as required by the Act.22
A gangplank, traditionally a part of the equipment of the ship and not
permanently attached to shore, was regarded as a part of the ship and
fell within the jurisdiction of the Act.2 3
Longshoremen are constantly moving from the ship to the land and
back again and, consequently, move in and out of the legislation's
coverage continually, notwithstanding the fact that they remain long-
shoremen throughout.2 4 This does not mean that a longshoreman in-
jured on a pier is without a remedy, as he may qualify under other
federal and state acts.25 1 However, because of the shortness of both the
federal and state statutes of limitations,26 a plaintiff mistakenly initiat-
ing his action in the wrong jurisdiction may be foreclosed from any
compensation 27 To avoid this and allow recovery, the courts have some-
times predicated jurisdiction on strange and even humorous distinc-
tions between land and navigable water. For example, if the employee
is struck by a boom while standing on the pier and is knocked into the
water and drowns, the injury is considered to have occurred in naviga-
ble waters2 The same was held for death benefits for a fatal skull frac-
ture received when an automobile was driven off the end of a pier onto
solid ice.2 "Upon navigable waters" has also been held to include in-
juries sustained while flying over the water,3 0 and this sound result was
dubiously extended to include a worker who was momentarily lifted
22. See, e.g., Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946); Industrial Commission v.
Nordenholt, 259 U.S. 263 (1922); Hastings v. Mann, 340 F.2d 910, 911-12 (4th Cir. 1965);
American Export Lines, Inc. v. Revel, 266 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1959); Johnson v. Traynor,
243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965).
23. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 US. 205 (1917); Taylor v. Baltimore &
O.R.R. Co., 344 F.2d 281 (2nd Cir. 1965).
24. "Any rule that we [adopt in applying 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964)] . . . is necessarily
arbitrary from the longshoremen's point of view because the boundary line between land
and sea is crossed by a great deal of traffic and many injuries occur near the line."
Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1965) (Hays, J., dissenting).
25. See Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of
1927: Half-Way Protection for the Stevedore and the Longshoreman, 64 MicH. L. REv.
1553, 1554 (1966).
26. See, e.g., Ayers v. Parker, 15 F. Supp. 447 (D. Md. 1936); 33 U.S.C. § 913 (1964);
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-87 (1964).
27. See A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (App. B) 524-28 (Supp. 1968).
28. See, e.g., Noah v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 267 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1959); Marine Steve-
doring Corp. v. Oosting, 238 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. Va. 1965).
29. Interlake $S. Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1964).
30. D'Aleman v. Pan American World Airways, 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).
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from the pier by a swinging boom and then dropped once again onto
the pier.3 ' It has been argued several times that "upon navigable
waters" includes any wharf or pier which has sufficient water flowing
beneath it to facilitate the navigation of a small boat. Until Marine
Stevedoring, the courts uniformly rejected this theory.32 When the
situs of the injury is unknown, it would seem that the longshoreman
may elect between state and federal recovery.33 Beyond this, however,
while the Act is to "be liberally construed in conformance with its
purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results,"34
it would appear that it is entirely possible that two harbor workers,
standing on the same wharf, doing the same job, and hit by the same
swinging draft, may fall within diverse compensation jurisdictions de-
pending either on where the crane was located 35 or where they are
thrown by the impact.3 6
In recent years, a dispute largely based among the District Courts37
and sometimes extending into the Circuit Courts38 has developed con-
cerning the effect of the Admiralty Extension Act of 194839 on the
"navigable waters" requirement of the Longshoremen's Act. It has
been contended, unsuccessfully, that the expanded admiralty tort juris-
diction under that Act similarly expanded the scope of the Longshore-
men's Act to include injuries sustained completely on land.40 The
31. Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968).
32. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Calbeck, 385 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1051 (1968); Traielers Ins. Co. v. Shea, 382 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1967).
3. The Longshoremen's Act provides that jurisdiction is presumed unless there is
substantial evidence presented to the contrary. 33 U.S.C. § 920(a) (1964). See Marine
Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 238 F. Supp. 78, (E.D. Va. 1965). Contra Atlantic Stevedoring
Co. v. O'Keeffe, 220 F. Supp. 881, 885 (S.D. Ga. 1963).
34. Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953), quoted in Reed v. S.S. Yaka, 373 U.S. 410
(1963).
35. Compare Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935) with T. Smith
& Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928).
36. See Noah v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 267 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1959).
37. See Hendricks, Jurisdiction in Longshoremen's Injuries, 16 CLEV. MAR. L. REv. 124,
127-29 (1967).
38. See, e.g., Interlake S.S. Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879, 882-83 (6th Cir. 1964); American
Export Lines, Inc. v. Revel, 266 F.2d 82, 84 (4th Cir. 1959).
39. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
40. See, e.g., American Export Lines, Inc. v. Revel, 266 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1959); Gladden
v. Stockard S.S. Co., 184 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1950); East v. Oosting, 245 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va.
1965); Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965); Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v.
Arrien, 233 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1965); Atlantic
Stevedoring Co. v. O'Keeffe, 220 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ga. 1963). But see Interlake S.S. Co. v.
Nielsen, 338 F2d 879 (6th Cir 1964).
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express language of the statute refutes the argument, 41 and indeed, the
Fourth Circuit until Marine Stevedoring had consistently held that the
Extension Act did not and was not intended to have any effect on the
jurisdictional requirements of the Longshoremen's Act.42 While the
Supreme Court has yet to consider the question, detailed analysis of
the argument by several District Courts indicates that, in light of the
more recent Supreme Court decisions, the argument is not a strong
one.43
III. THE CALBECK ARGUMENT
A survey of the massive digest of Longshoremen's Act litigation
since 1927 indicates that the courts have been primarily concerned, not
with the jurisdiction of the act to land-based injuries, but rather, with
the jurisdictional scope of state workmen's compensation acts to injur-
ies sustained on the water.44 Two judicial nightmares under the Act
have been the "maritime but local" doctrine4 and the subsequently
developed "twilight zone." 46 The Supreme Court in Calbeck v. Travel-
ers Insurance Company47 attempted to cure many of the anomalies pres-
ent under the "maritime but local" doctrine.48 The decision was con-
cerned directly with the interpretation of the phrase ". . . if recovery
for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceed-
ings may not validly be provided by state law . . ."4 as a condition
precedent to federal jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit in Marine Steve-
doring, while recognizing that the decision was not concerned with an
41. ". . . [A]ll cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on
navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated
on land." 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964) (emphasis added). This argument is fully developed in
Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 233 F. Supp. 496, 501-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 344
F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1965).
42. See American Export Lines, Inc. v. Revel, 266 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1959); cf. Boston
Metals Co. v. O'Hearne, 329 F.2d 504 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 824 (1964).
43. Cf. Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
44. See, e.g., Note, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act of 1927: Half-Way
Protection for the Stevedore and the Longshoreman, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1553 (1966).
45. See generally G. GIMoRE & C. BLACK, ADMIRALTY §§ 6-48 to -52 (1957).
46. See generally Gainsburgh & Fallon, Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.: The
Twilights Last Gleaming?, 37 Tur.. L. Rxv. 79 (1962).
47. 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
48. Many commentators indicate that the "maritime but local" doctrine was abolished.
See Note, Admiralty and Workmen's Compensation: "Maritime but Local" Doctrine
Rejected as Limitation on Federal Jurisdiction under the Longshoremen's Act, 1963
DuKE L.J. 327.
49. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964).
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interpretation of "upon navigable waters," concluded that dictum in
the Supreme Court opinion "authoritatively resolved"50 the issue of
status versus situs before them in favor of a contractual, occupational-
status approach. Such an interpretation of Calbeck at the very least
seems highly strained and is easily questioned in view of the express
holding of the case, which distinguished the land and water injuries.51
Nor does such an interpretation square with the intent the Supreme
Court has evinced in Calbeck and earlier decisions.52 Indeed, subse-
quent litigation under Calbeck has indicated that the decision stands
authoritatively for only one proposition: "All injuries occurring on
navigable waters are in the purview of the [Longshoremen's Act]. 53
CONCLUSION
The legislative history of the Longshoremen's Act, the Admiralty
Extension Act of 1948, the forty-one years of case law, and the recent
decision of Calbeck do not lend ready support to the Fourth Circuit's
conclusion in Marine Stevedoring. There is a seemingly harsh and in-
congruous result in the case of two companion longshoremen who are
hit by a flying boom, one ultimately recovering greater benefits under
the federal act because he was catapulted into the water by the impact.
The apparent incongruity, however, is clearly consistent with the Su-
50. 398 F.2d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1968).
51. The Court in Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968), does
not set out the express holding of Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962), as
they did in Boston Metals Co. v. O'Heare, 329 F.2d 504 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
824 (1964), where they ruled that under Calbeck, supra, the locale of the injury brought
the workman within the Longshoremen's Act. The Supreme Court expressly held in
Calbeck, supra: "Our conclusion is that Congress invoked its constitutional power so as
to provide compensation for all injuries sustained by employees on navigable waters
whether or not a particular injury might also have been within the constitutional reach
of a state workmen's compensation law." 370 U.S. 114, 117 (1962). In Boston Metals,
supra, the workman was not a longshoreman, yet the Fourth Circuit did not consider the
occupational status as significant. Cf. Sanderlin v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 385
F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1967).
52. See Note, Admiralty and Workmen's Compensation: "Maritime but Local" Doctrine
Rejected as Limitation on Federal Jurisdiction under the Longshoremen's Act, 1963 Dunn
L.J. 326, 333; cf. Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 US. 249 (1942). Calbeck v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962), indicates the Supreme Court's desire to (1) assure that all
employees injured in or around navigable waters are covered by at least one compen-
sation law, and (2) that the claimant might readily and without expense or litigation
determine the proper forum. Calbeck, supra, accomplished this result by drawing a strict
line for the federal jurisdiction at the shoreline.
53. Comment, Conflict Between State and Federal Compensation Law in Admiralty:
From Jensen to Calbeck and Beyond, 35 Miss. L.J. 84, 102 (1963).
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preme Court's view that a position should be taken that will place each
worker under the constant protection of some compensation law, with
a clear guideline as to which jurisdiction either must or may be elected
by the plaintiff for recovery.54 This position has been resolved to be
a firm line at the shore, at least as far as the jurisdiction of the federal
act is concerned.55
The Fourth Circuit prior to Marine Stevedoring had indicated in
several decisions that the locale or situs of the injury was the proper
characterization of the jurisdictional requirement under the Long-
shoremen's Act.56 A reversal of this position to one based on the nature
and subject matter of the employee's contract would clearly expand the
jurisdiction of the federal coverage to all stevedores, including those
validly covered presently by state workmen's compensation. At the
same time, such a characterization would exclude from coverage work-
men whose employment was not maritime in nature, even though they
were injured on navigable waters. And if JensenGs were followed, such
workmen would be equally remediless in a state proceeding (unless the
"maritime but local" doctrine were revived).
There seems to be no logical reason to invite another round of con-
fusion in the courts over the jurisdiction of the Longshoremen's Act.
It is precisely such confusion that the Supreme Court sought to elim-
inate in Calbeck with its positive holding that all injuries upon navi-
gable waters are encompassed under the federal act. No doubt some
unfair differentiations still exist which will occur under a strict land-
water dividing line, but this danger is clearly outweighed by the estab-
lishment of understandable and predictable jurisdictional boundaries
which will afford all workers a remedy of some kind. The intent of
Congress to provide some form of compensation for the longshoremen
and harbor workers, wherever the injury is sustained, has been accom-
54. See Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 870 U.S. 114, 124 (1962).
55. It may be that under Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., a workman injured upon
navigable waters, but otherwise falling within the "maritime but local" exception, may
elect either federal or state compensation. See Note, Admiralty and Workmen's Com.
pensation: "Maritime but Local" Doctrine Rejected as Limitation on Federal Jurisdiction
under the Longshoremen's Act, 1963 DuKE LJ. 326, 333.
56. See Hastings v. Mann, 340 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1965); Boston Metals Co. v. O'Hearne,
329 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1964); American Export Lines, Inc. v. Revel, 266 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.
1959).
57. See American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947).
58. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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plished.5  To follow the tack advocated in Marine Stevedoring is to at-
tempt judicially to legislate a higher recovery for the land-injured long-
shoreman, when the intent of the 1927 Act was to provide some recov-
ery to water-injured harbor workers who were otherwise without pro-
tection.
59. See Clark, The Longshoreman and Accident Compensation, 22 MONTHLY LAB. Rv.
753 (1926).
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